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Introduction ▪
The debate over how Europe should organise solidarity and jointly respond to the COVID 
induced economic crisis is in full force, with various proposals either agreed or at debate 
such as the  use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the creation of new common 
debt instruments or the mobilisation of the upcoming Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(MFF). So far, however, the prime responses to the economic shock have been located at 
the national level, not only being proof of the fact that most firefighting is done at the level 
of Europe’s nation-states but also displaying the inequalities of fiscal capacity that still loom 
large in the EU’s political economy. 
There have been various studies and reports comparing governments’ initial fiscal responses 
to the COVID-19 crisis1. While there are differences in the size and composition of fiscal 
packages, a common feature that emerges is the strong reliance on credit guarantees and 
other liquidity support measures. Less appreciated in current debates is the fact that these 
measures are often administered and distributed by a specific sort of para-fiscal actors: 
development banks, or national promotional institutions. Even at the European level, signi-
ficant parts of the common response to the economic impact of the pandemic rest on the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). 
This policy brief highlights the key role these para-fiscal institutions play in Europe and reviews 
the similarities and differences in their responses by focusing on five large institutions (EIB, 
KfW, Bpifrance, CDP, ICO)2. It explains how these entities have worked as governments’ 'little 
helpers' in the European context of the past decade and points to key challenges that come 
with their role in terms of a coordinated and solidarity-based European effort. 
1. See for instance Bruegel, "The fiscal response to the economic fallout from the coronavirus", Blogpost, last update: 23 April 2020.  
OECD, "SME responses", note prepared for discussion by the OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE), last updated: 30 
March 2020; HAINBACK and REKEDER, "Flattening the Recession Curve. Comparing Initial Fiscal Responses to the Corona Crisis Across the EU", 
Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, 9 April 2020.
2. Acronyms stand for European Investment Bank, the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, the French Bpifrance, the Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
and the Spanish Instituto de Crédito Official.
Photo by Floriane Vita on Unsplash
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1 ▪ PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT BANKS:  
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE EU´S ECONOMIC POLICY TOOLKIT
National development banks (NDBs) such as Germany’s KfW, Italy’s CDP or Spain’s ICO are 
government-owned financial institutions that engage in economic activities to promote 
national economic goals. Usually equipped with public guarantees, they vary in terms of 
governance, mandate and scope. Most of them combine for-profit and non-profit activities 
to support both structural transformation and countercyclical activities, and have a focus on 
small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)3. Likewise, the EU’s multilateral development 
bank, the EIB group, is mandated to support European integration and the common market 
through financing infrastructure and entrepreneurship across the EU.
The past decade has seen a significant expansion of these banks’ capacities and invest-
ment tasks as well as the creation of new institutions in Member States which had no NDB 
so far. During the 2008 financial crisis and the following Euro area crisis, they played an 
important countercyclical role helping firms to mitigate the impact of the economic shock. 
More recently, their role as supporters of long-term transformations has been increasingly 
recognized in the context of debates on EU industrial policy and the transition to a low-
carbon economy. In addition to that, since 2014, with Jean-Claude Juncker’s Investment Plan 
for Europe, they have intensified their coordination to leverage constrained fiscal resources, 
taking first steps to Europeanizing investment policy based on subsidiary action. There are 
now over 25,000 bankers employed at both NDBs and the EIB group (about 4,000 for the EIB 
group alone), which, thanks to the Juncker Fund, have developed several institutional chan-
nels and financial instruments to coordinate their activities. This collaboration will be further 
reinforced with the new instrument replacing the Juncker Fund after 2020, the InvestEU 
Fund.
The reasons why public development banks have experienced such a ‘comeback’ in the EU 
are both political and economic. They involve the failure of the private financial sector to 
provide longer-term finance for projects that have gained political priority among European 
policymakers. Development banks have also been useful to escape the fiscal straitjackets 
many governments found themselves in during the 2010s. Indeed, NDBs and the EIB can 
provide quick fixes through established programs, based on leveraging guarantees that do 
not immediately hurt public budgets, and thereby facilitate manoeuvring around limited fiscal 
capacities, may they be national or supranational. As both financial institutions and bureau-
cracies, state-owned development banks in the EU have thus acquired a crucial position in 
contemporary economic governance over the last decade, bridging state-market-divides, not 
as fiscal activists but as risk managers and lenders. It is at this point that governments were 
compelled to respond to the economic shocks brought by the Covid-19 pandemic.
3. For a global perspective see GRIFFITH-JONES et al.: Mobilizing Development Banks to Fight Covid-19. Project Syndicate, 8 April 2020.
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2 ▪ THE DIFFERENT MOBILISATION OF  
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT BANKS  
IN FIGHTING THE COVID-19 ECONOMIC SHOCK
Since mid-March 2020, most European governments’ responses to the Corona-induced 
economic shock have made use of their development banks to ease financing and liquidity 
constraints experienced by firms of all size. If we look at the EU level as well as Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain, one can observe some common features in the way development 
banks have been mobilised in response to the Covid-19 crisis. In all cases the focus has 
been on micro-enterprises and SMEs, which is understandable given their strong depen-
dency on bank financing and their inability to directly access the capital market or benefit 
from the ECB liquidity measures. In addition, national loan guarantee schemes present many 
common features – in terms of risk coverage, amount of loans, guarantee duration – which 
can be explained by the fact of being designed in line with temporary changes in the Euro-
pean state aid framework under which development banks operate. 
Box 1 ▪ The temporary framework for state aid measures to support the economy in the COVID-19 outbreak: Changes for 
loan guarantee programmes
On March 19 and April 3, the Commission adopted a series of measures to relax state aid rules in order to allow governments help businesses 
through the crisis. Part of these measures were intended to facilitate the provision of public aid in the form of guarantees on loans, subsidised 
loans or equity, either directly or channelled through credit institutions or other financial institutions. The most spectacular measure was the 
decision of April 3 to enable member states to give guarantees on loans covering 100% of the risk. This type of aid is limited to loans of up to 
€ 800.000 per firm. It shall be granted before 31 December 2020 and cannot benefit firms which were already in difficulty by December 2019.
For loans exceeding € 800,000, the temporary state aid framework allows member states to provide guarantees on loans covering 90% of 
the risk to firms. As in the previous case, only firms which were not already in difficulty are eligible for this guarantee. Besides, the amount 
of the loan cannot exceed 25% of the firm’s annual turnover for 2019 or twice the cost of personnel. As an exception to this rule, the amount 
of the loan can be superior to the limit of 25% of firm´ s annual turnover or two times the cost in personnel to cover the liquidity needs if the 
firms provide appropriate justification of expenditure needs for the coming 18 months (in case of SMEs) or 12 months (for large enterprises).
Finally, the Commission’s Communication explicitly mentions that these temporary measures can be combined with pre-crisis state aid mea-
sures such as the so-called de minimis aid. Under “de minimis” regulation, states can provide grants of up to €200,000, 5-year loans up to 
€1m, or 10-year loans up to €1.5m, without requiring prior state aid notification.
Table 1 (following page) presents a detailed overview of the proposals, budgetary efforts 
and measures on which the mobilisation of public development banks in the Covid-19 crisis 
rests. In the following, we zoom in on each institution listed.
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At the EU-level, following the endorsement of the Eurogroup, on April 16 the Board of 
Directors of the European Investment Bank (EIB) agreed on the creation of a new €200bn 
guarantee fund based on €25bn Member States´ guarantees. The Fund will be operational 
as soon as Member States accounting for at least 60% of EIB capital have made the neces-
sary commitments. Prior to that, on March 16 the EIB group had already announced a plan 
to mobilise up to €40bn of liquidity support to mid-cap and SMEs4. The plan was based on 
a repurposing of €2.5bn of the EU budget guarantee to the EIB (the so-called “Juncker Fund” 
guarantee, or EFSI5) and the mobilisation of €5bn EIB own resources. The key measure 
of the plan was the extension and modification of the two main loan guarantee schemes 
managed by the European Investment Fund (EIF) targeting SMEs and mid-caps, the COSME 
loan guarantee scheme (providing support to SMEs) and InnovFin SMEG (providing support 
to innovative SMEs and small mid-caps with less than 500 employees). In particular, the risk 
coverage of both programmes was increased to 80% (as opposed to the standard 50%) and 
the COSME loan guarantee was capped at 25% of total commercial banks’ loan portfolios 
(rather than the standard 20%). In addition to that, the EIF introduced a simplified and fast 
approval process and flexibilized the terms of loans, including possibilities to postpone or 
reschedule payments or obtain a ‘payment holiday’. 
The German government announced its key programme on March 23, followed by a sup-
plementary federal budget, in which its national development bank KfW – besides a number 
of guarantee banks - took a central role. At the heart of it was the ‘KfW Special Programme 
2020’ in which the government literally committed itself to ‘unlimited’ support for struggling 
businesses by extending the explicit state guarantee KfW enjoys from €460bn to €822bn. In 
addition, KfW would receive €100bn to refinance the programme’s lending operations. Buil-
ding on its established lending programmes, KfW eased credit conditions for all company 
sizes, including increasing the risk ratio it would assume when passing the loans through 
the commercial banking sector. But when even 90 per cent of risk assumption by the KfW 
was debated as a hindrance to credit expansion, this put pressure on a further relaxation of 
state aid conditions. After their amendment on April 3, KfW and the German government 
announced a further ‘instant loan’ programme for SMEs, in which KfW would assume 100 
per cent of the credit risk that would otherwise lie with the ‘Hausbank’ administering the 
loan. The German response is one of the starkest examples of using a development bank 
for countercyclical activity, which seems less of a surprise given that KfW is the largest 
operating NDB in Europe, with a history in reconstructing post-war Germany and processing 
German reunification.
The French government announced its first package to fight the Coronavirus on March 
17, with its national development bank Bpifrance playing a central role in its crisis-fighting 
effort. At the heart of it is a €300bn credit guarantee for small and medium sized enterprises 
granted by the state, which empowers Bpifrance to guarantee 90% of banks’ loans to corpo-
rations between 3-7 years, with a possibility of stopping reimbursement for a total of 2 years. 
In addition, Bpifrance enacts more generous schemes for very small enterprises, covering 
up to 100% of loans without any collateral, a program developed pre-crisis in compliance 
with the EU de minimis rules. In addition, Bpifrance has pledged to renew all of the loans cur-
rently on its balance sheet and permit a maximum of 6 months of non-reimbursement. While 
smaller than the German program, the engagement of Bpifrance also shows a pronounced 
countercyclical element, based on a strong balance sheet generated through successful 
years pre-Covid-19. As the field of expertise of Bpifrance encompasses venture capital, it 
4. For a definition see European Commission, "What is an SME".
5. EFSI refers to the European Fund for Strategic Investments. RUBIO E., D. RINALDI and T. PELLERIN-CARLIN 2016. “Investment in Europe: Making 
the best of the Juncker Plan with case studies on digital infrastructure and energy efficiency”, Studies & Reports No. 108, Jacques Delors Institute, 
Paris.
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has also taken up the role to support French start-ups. For this purpose, the French state 
has set up a €4bn program to support start-ups during the crisis, giving the venture capital 
teams at Bpifrance the task to invest this money. In this context, a first 80 million Euros debt 
investment convertible into equity is to be issued soon. 
The Italian government adopted two consecutive packages of economic measures to 
fight the crisis, on March 16 (“Cura Italia” Decree-Law) and April 8 (“Liquidity” Decree-Law). 
While the Italian national development bank, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) played a rele-
vant role it did not take the elevated position of its German or French counterparts. The two 
decrees reinforced the role of the Central Guarantee Fund for SMEs (Italy’s main national 
credit guarantee facility for SMEs, attached to the Ministry of Economy). With an injection 
of €1.5bn (“Cura Italia”) and €7bn (“Liquidity”) and various changes to expand the scope 
and access to the Fund (such as the increase of the maximum guarantee from €2.5m to 
€5m and the establishment of a new instant loan scheme providing 100% free-of-charge 
guarantees for loans up to €800.000 to firms under 500 employees and self-employers), the 
objective was to increase the amount of liquidity support provided by the Fund from €60bn 
to €100bn approximately. CDP´s contribution was mostly expected as regards medium to 
large firms. The Decree-Law of March 17 increased the State guarantee to Italy’s national 
development bank by €500m, so as to allow CDP to finance a new €10bn liquidity line to 
support targeted medium and large companies operating in sectors particularly affected 
by the Covid-19 crisis. Finally, the Decree of April 8 has created a new €200bn loan gua-
rantee programme. This programme aims to help all firms affected by COVID - with SMEs 
having access if they have exhausted the credit provided by the Guarantee Fund. It provides 
guarantees with 70-90% risk coverage (depending on the size of the firm), with firms sub-
jected to some conditions to be eligible, such as the fact of not distributing dividends or 
using the funding to finance activities located in Italy. However, although this new scheme is 
managed by SACE, the CDP´s export agency, the “Liquidity” Decree explicitly stipulates that 
“SACE S.p.A. is not subject to the management and coordination activity of CDP S.p.A.”, thus 
ensuring the government’s control over the new guarantee scheme6 while underlining the 
package’s emphasis on export and internationalization. 
The Spanish government adopted a package of economic measures on March 18, with its 
national development bank (Instituto de Crédito Oficial, ICO) playing a central role in the pro-
vision of liquidity. A key measure of this package was a new €100bn loan guarantee scheme 
managed by ICO to support companies affected by the Covid-19 crisis. The ICO Covid-19 
programme started to be implemented in late March with an injection of €20bn from the 
government. It offers less generous terms than the new Italian, French or German loan gua-
rantees in support to firms, covering up to 80% of risk in the case of loans for self-employed 
workers and SMEs. For the rest of firms, it covers 70% of new loans and 60% of renewal 
operations. The guarantee is not free of charge, but commercial banks are supposed to 
transfer the benefits of the public guarantee to their customers, in the form of lower interest 
or longer-term loans, among other options. Lastly, the only element in which the Spanish 
guarantee seems to be more generous than the Italian, French or German is the size of 
provided loans. In line with the temporary European state aid rules, it is allowed to increase 
the amount of the loan to cover spending needs duly justified for the following 18 months 
(SMEs) or 12 months (large firms). Apart from this new ICO guarantee scheme, the Royal 
Decree-Law of March 18 included an increase of the credit authorisation to ICO by €10bn, to 
allow the bank to refinance all of its lending programmes. It also increased the ICO “Thomas 
Cook” loan guarantee line by €200m, providing support to firms and self-employed workers 
in the tourism sector with a guarantee of 50% to loans up to €500,000, thereby reflecting the 
sector’s importance for the Spanish economy.
6.  "Decreto imprese sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale: Sace passa sotto il controllo del ministero dell’Economia", La Stampa, 13 april 2020.
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In almost all other EU countries with national development banks, similar schemes have 
been enacted. The main exceptions have been Portugal and Hungary, which have used 
other channels, either going directly through the banking system or creating new funds. As 
in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, in most of the countries the key measure has been the 
expansion of credit guarantees with a risk coverage of up to 90% for SMEs, but also to larger 
companies, as evidenced by the measures taken by the  BGK (Poland), MDB (Malta), Almi 
(SE), Vaekstfonden (DK), Finnvera (Finland), BDB (Bulgaria), Kredex (Estonia), Altum (Latvia), 
Invega (Lithuania), SID (Slovenia), HBOR (Croatia), SZRMB (Slovakia), and CMZRB (Czech 
Republic)7. Sectors particularly targeted have been tourism and dining, but also the small 
production sector and the export sector, specifically addressed through export guarantees. 
A few of these entities, such as Invega in Lithuania and Vaekstfonden in Denmark, have also 
provided funds for start-ups. Sometimes these measures have gone hand in hand with a 
direct expansion of the capital stock of these entities, such as in the case of the Bulgarian 
Development Bank with an expansion of €255m. In most of the cases, however, the new 
measures have been financed through direct support by the Ministries of Finance.   
CONCLUSION: NEED TO LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD ▪
Despite the general tendency in European member states to employ their development 
banks to provide liquidity and improve credit conditions within the temporary framework for 
state aid measures – save the EIB –, both the size of measures and the capacities of these 
banks to implement them differ starkly, even among the large NDBs. Indeed, the unequal 
credit conditions and fiscal abilities of their sovereigns affect their own room to manoeuvre. 
In addition, as the European Court of Auditors has shown with regard to the Juncker Fund, 
large member states with well-established development banks tend to be better equipped 
to mobilise EU financial instruments and put them to use locally. This works particularly 
well when NDBs have local presence, such as Bpifrance with 50 local branches, or when 
there is a network of other subnational development finance or guarantee institutions, as is 
the case of KfW or CDP. But many smaller institutions in the European periphery have signi-
ficantly less strategic capacity to put fresh capital to work, especially if one starts to think 
about bundling countercyclical intervention with medium-term goals in addressing struc-
tural and environmental challenges.8 
In the past crisis, differences in national fiscal capacities were partly mitigated with NDBs 
from crisis-hit countries receiving credit lines from NDBs from stronger countries (such as 
KfW). This is an avenue of action which has been recently proposed by members of the 
German Green Party as a basis for solidarity loans in the Corona crisis, and which would be 
worth exploring.
More importantly, it will be necessary to ensure that any future European response colla-
borates well with these national schemes and helps mitigate the financial and institutional 
inequalities between Member States. The €200bn pan-European guarantee scheme 
adopted by the EIB can be an important step in this direction. The Eurogroup´s statement 
explicitly mentioned that this initiative should be "an important contribution to preserving the 
7. For a selective overview see European Association of Public Banks (EAPB): "Public banks take measures to address the economic impact of the 
Coronavirus epidemic", 2 April 2020. "Milliarder klar til SMV’er: Nu kan Vækstfonden yde garantier til små og mellemstore erhvervsdrivende ramt af 
COVID-19", Vreksfonden, 23 March 2020. "Covid-19-affected businesses can apply for ALTUM support programs as of today", Altum, 25 March 2020. 
"KredEx begins offering the first crisis measures in cooperation with banks", Kredex.
8. See the discussion in MERTENS, THIEMANN and VOLBERDING (forthcoming): The Reinvention of Development Banking in the European Union. 
Industrial Policy in the Single Market and the Emergence of a Field. Oxford University Press.
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level playing field of the single market in light of the national support schemes". However, we 
still do not know the details of this measure. 
To ensure this level playing field, the new €200bn guarantee should be mostly directed 
at countries with the lowest fiscal capacity and which are most severely affected by the 
Covid-19 crisis. Thus, the KfW programme should already be sufficient to cushion the fall-out 
of the crisis in Germany, with no additional European support needed. On the contrary, in 
countries such as Italy and Spain, national guarantee schemes may soon be exhausted and 
additional EU support may be necessary. 
In addition, to be effective, the new €200bn EIB-managed guarantee scheme should pro-
vide liquidity support in much more generous terms than existing EIF-managed guarantee 
instruments. A 2017 report of the European Court of Auditors shows that the EU's centrally 
managed guarantee instruments (COSME LGT and InnovFin SMEG) were significantly less 
successful in terms of uptake in those Member States receiving financial assistance during 
the 2008 economic recession as they did not provide strong liquidity relief. The new EIB gua-
rantee should be provided at 90% or even 100% terms, as with the new national schemes.
Finally, from an institutional point of view, the best guarantee to ensure a good coordination 
with existing national schemes and an optimal use of EU resources would be to place this 
new €200bn guarantee scheme in the EFSI framework instead of creating a new, parallel 
structure. This would not necessarily require an expansion of the EU budget: the EFSI regu-
lation allows to increase the EFSI guarantee with direct Member State contributions. Hence, 
the €25bn Member State guarantees could be included in the EFSI guarantee and used to 
fund a new loan guarantee scheme under the SME window of EFSI. The advantages of inclu-
ding the €25bn Member State guarantees in the EFSI structure is that it would guarantee 
the involvement of the Commission in the steering of this new instrument as well as the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors in the supervision of its implemen-
tation. This would ensure that this new EU-level instrument adds to commercial lending and 
links with existing national schemes. After 2021, this instrument would be naturally included 
in the InvestEU Fund, the successor of EFSI.
To be sure, while these options could address asymmetries between these actors, they will 
not be sufficient to address the underlying centrifugal forces of unequal fiscal capacities at 
the national level. At the current impasse, however, this para-fiscal infrastructure is better 
equipped to help SMEs and self-employed workers than any other ready-made solution, both 
when compared to other countries, such as the US, and the political contention around fiscal 
activism. Hence, European governments are shaping up as ‘ultimate risk managers’ through 
NDBs in the urgency of the situation. Though – as many observers and even heads of states 
suggest – if the economic system will not return to ‘normal’, ‘the buck still stops with them’.
